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Abstract
The subject of this paper is Confucianism as a political ideology that operated within complex 
strategies of assimilation, resistance and appropriation in French Indochina. Through an 
exploration of the ways in which Confucianism was interpreted and appropriated, by both the 
colonizers and the colonized, I will illustrate how morality, and claims to morality, became 
political currency for both French imperialist and Vietnamese nationalist and communist 
endeavors. Fundamental social, ideological, imperial, national and political tensions are implicit 
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in the vacillating and contradictory policies and attitudes vis-àvis Confucianism. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that the moral imperative became an indispensable part of both French imperial and 
Vietnamese revolutionary rhetoric. 
The first half of the paper addresses imperial policies of assimilation, association, collaboration 
and mise-en-valeur, as well as Vichyite federalism and traditionalism, particularly with regard 
to education. I will examine these in light of their implications for Confucian institutions and 
ideology. The second half of the paper addresses the intersection of Confucianism with 
Vietnamese Communism. Continuity and symbiosis, both as ideology and as social import, are 
given particular emphasis. 
Introduction
The subject of this paper is a utilitarian understanding of Confucianism in the context of late 
19th and early 20th century French Indochina. Through exploring the various and contradictory 
ways in which the Confucian ideology was employed, both by the colonizers and the colonized, I 
shall illustrate the processes and interests whereby claims to morality became used as political 
currency. The moral imperative became an indispensable part of both French imperial and 
Vietnamese revolutionary rhetoric as imperial apologias and communist iconoclasm. It is my 
contention that Confucianism in colonial Vietnam was as much a political as a moral ideology 
and that it became an integral part of political strategies of assimilation and exclusion - a 
bulwark of the status quo and a rallying call for change.
The historian of French Indochina and the 1945 Revolution, Pierre Brocheux, asserts that Ho 
Chi Minh was not so much a Communist or a Nationalist as a Confucian, but rather that he was a 
Confucian Communist and Nationalist. This brings to the fore the ambiguous and multifarious 
uses and meanings of "Confucianism." It is this fluidity of meaning, in its intellectual, historical 
and political manifestations, that has made Confucianism key to the multiple levels of power-
politics associated with French colonial rule and the Vietnamese struggle for national 
emancipation.
Confucianism has variously been lauded and denounced by both French colonists and 
Vietnamese nationalists. As part of the justification for la mission civilatrice, or the French 
"civilizing mission," Confucian institutions and systems (most visibly manifested by civil-service 
examinations and village educational structures) were subject to hostile French policies which 
sought to undermine and diminish their influence. As a conservative social force and bulwark of 
the imperial status quo, Confucianism and the class of mandarins were appropriated and co-
opted into official ideology and strategies such as "divide-and-rule" by the French ruling elite. 
The policies and ideas of Admiral Decoux's Vichy regime are particularly revelatory, both of 
existing strategies and as a reorientation of French policy which nevertheless sought many of the 
same goals as Republican France. Similarly, the history of Vietnamese nationalism and identity 
with regard to Confucian ideology, institutions and structures has always been fraught with 
ambiguities. Representations of Vietnamese Communism as an exercise in anti-Confucianism 
fail to accord with the composition of Vietnamese Communist leadership, the majority of whom 
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were derived from the scholar-gentry elite of Vietnamese society, who were the keepers of the 
Confucian canon of the Sino-Vietnamese tradition.[1] Vietnamese Communism was arguably as 
much in the tradition of the Vietnamese Confucian scholar-patriot as it was a reproduction of 
Marxist-Leninism. Through an analysis of the ways in which Confucianism was interpreted and 
appropriated, both by the colonizers and the colonized, a political discourse emerges that posits 
morality within broader strategies of political legitimacy and nation-building. Just as 
Confucianism and French Imperialism were not always diametrically opposed, so Confucianism 
and Communism could make co-operative bed-fellows. 
Confucianism and French Imperialism
The French colonial project in Southeast Asia was characterized by inherent, destabilizing 
contradictions which found expression in the quick turnover of official policies and ideologies 
over the relatively short period of French imperial rule from the mid 19th to mid 20th centuries. 
The educational policies of the French colonial regime, vis-à-vis policies of assimilation, 
association, mise-en-valeur and the Vichyite National Revolution, are particularly illuminating 
with regard to the "tensions of empire" which anthropologist Ann Laura Stoler describes as a 
relationship of "inclusionary impulses and exclusionary practices."[2]
Film critic and social historian Panivong Norindr writes of the discrepancies between the 
Enlightened ideals of the French Republic and the prerogatives of imperial France. The 
contradiction between the liberal aspiration to "raise all peoples to an equality of mind" and 
pedagogical practices predicated on exclusion were not lost on those defending French 
colonialism in Southeast Asia. Norindr writes: "the only solution was to provide natives ... with a 
different type of education, one that would not foster liberal ideas."[3] The internal 
contradictions of colonial education represent the self-defeating justifications of and rationales 
for French imperialism. Immediately following the period of conquest and pacification (1860-
1890), France sought a broader, more appealing and ethically sound basis for its imperial power 
than physical might and international power-politics.[4] Nicola Cooper writes of the "French 
colonial ideal .. [as] a conception of colonial expansionism which sought to coincide and accord 
with Republicanism and humanitarianism, whilst simultaneously ... [renewing] French grandeur 
and prestige."[5] This was the ideal of mise-en-valeur:
a term which connotes not only economic development ... but also the moral and 
cultural improvement to be wrought in the colonies ... the moral and cultural 
dimension stemmed from the French belief in the universal value of its civilization.
[6]
This vision of an altruistic French motherland endeavoring to "share the benefits of French 
civilization" hinged upon a devaluation of traditional Vietnamese society and culture.[7] In this 
respect, the traditional Confucian mores and structures of social organization were denigrated as 
the source of social decline and the "thousand-year-old torpor of the Asiatic world."[8] The 
words of Leon Perrier, Minister of Colonies, at the 1928 inauguration of the Indochina House in 
Paris are particularly representative of this official discourse and its concomitant educational 
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strategies: 
As soon as he enters the French school-room, the young school boy has the 
impression of entering another world ... One speaks to him of France as a divine 
guardian; one liberates his soul from ancestral terrors ... communicates to him a 
confidence in the future and a sense of progress to replace the tedious effort at 
memory which had paralyzed the intellectual activity of his race.[9]
Perhaps Perrier's rhetoric can best be explained by a brief foray into Hegelian thought, a pillar of 
the Western "Enlightened" tradition. Here, a metaphysical chain-of-being mimics the hierarchy 
of civilizations and the Scottish Enlightenment to underscore an "oriental despotism" that 
precludes human progress and parity with European man: 
No one can take an accurate survey of the different nations of Asia ...without 
remarking the near approaches they make to the same stage of civilization...Of 
some of the oldest nations...we acquire a practical ...knowledge, by our 
acquaintance with a living people, who have continued on the same soil...of those 
ancient nations, partake of the same manners, and are placed at...the same stage 
in the progress of society...The sagacity of Adam Smith induced him...to deny...any 
high attainments among those ancient nations...The opinion by which he supports 
his disbelief of the ancient civilization of Asia is at once philanthropic and 
profound;..."despotism" is more destructive...and adverse to the progress of the 
human mind, than anarchy itself.[10]
In Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, David G. Marr argues that Confucianism and Sino-
Vietnamese village schools, as the source of such "ancestral terrors," stood in the way of the 
mission civilatrice. The schools themselves were subject to concerted efforts between 1919 and 
1927 to eradicate traditional educational practices.[11] This particular breed of "philanthropic" 
cultural imperialism, endorsed by the assimilationist mise-en-valeur impulse, was, however, 
balanced and occasionally over-ridden by more pragmatic interests. Association, a reorientation 
of colonial policy which intended "native customs, institutions and organization to be respected 
as far as possible" was officially sanctioned in 1917.[12] 
However, it is my contention that this policy cannot be adequately understood divorced from its 
more utilitarian incarnation: collaboration. French administrative control relied significantly on 
the collaboration of the Vietnamese mandarin elite.[13] In this respect, the Confucian system of 
social hierarchy and social control was an invaluable bureaucratic resource. The potential for 
Confucian ideas and organization to serve as a bulwark the French imperial status quo resulted 
in a French language curriculum which seemed to represent contradictory objectives to "impart 
French cultural and behavioral norms, to reinforce Vietnamese traditional morality, and to teach 
students how to read basic instructions and talk properly to their colonial masters."[14] 
Collaboration, then, only went so far. Collaboration was not egalitarianism. It follows that 
strategies vis-a-vis Confucianism became a means through which to simultaneously include the 
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scholar-gentry in the institutions of imperial control while maintaining the spheres of difference 
justifying exclusionary practices. Morality, in other words, could operate both to include and 
exclude. French officials invoked the threat of moral crises in order to curtail the social and 
political activism of Indochinese students in Paris in the 1930s and to justify their expulsion 
from the metropole.[15] Norindr cites the official rhetoric of the colonial department under 
Francois Pietri, to which, paradoxically, can be attributed the first articulation of the edifying 
liberal imperial aspiration to "raise all peoples to an equality of mind":
The Indochinese who come to Europe ... undergo a rapid transformation ... When 
they are not content to absorb the ... education which is given them and make 
themselves guilty of acts against public order, it is in their interest that they be 
returned to their natural milieu, where familial influence and influence of their 
ancestral tradition can aid them to emerge from ... crisis ...[16]
The "ancestral terrors" had been transformed and reiterated as a benevolent and utilitarian 
"ancestral tradition." French policies monitoring the flow of Vietnamese students to the 
metropole vacillated from the liberality of Governor-General Varenne to the draconian 
restrictions of his successor, Pierre Pasquier.[17]
The emphasis on morality instruction in the 1920s is emblematic of the contradictions of French 
colonial policy, which translated into an ambiguous and pragmatic attitude towards traditional 
Confucian ideas and institutions. The Confucian concern for social mores and the emphasis on 
morality as the basis of social order, was heightened in the 1920s by the turbulent changes 
associated with colonial rule and modernity. Marr writes: "The clash between old and new, East 
and West, collaborator and anticolonial, rich and poor, urban and rural, was tangible, and 
people had no certainty about what they should do in these circumstances."[18] French imperial 
conquest disrupted the traditional correlation between heaven and monarch, as embodied in the 
"Mandate of Heaven."[19] The Confucian literati sought moral justification and an ethical 
framework from which to understand contemporary events.[20] The French colonial 
government exploited this moral disquiet through polices that embodied both ideals of 
assimilation and association. Appealing to those members of the literati who were disillusioned 
with Confucian prescriptions, the French pushed their own moral ideas onto the colonial 
populous by importing and translating metropolitan textbooks on morale to be incorporated 
into the colonial curriculum.[21] These policies corresponded to the civilizing mission as well as 
the prerogatives of association and collaboration. Those Vietnamese who welcomed Western 
philosophy were more easily co-opted into the French paternalistic vision.[22] 
Ironically, however, assimilationist policies were promoted and carried out in ways that clearly 
sought justification and legitimation in Confucian terms. The French understood that the 
Vietnamese elite required "moral as well as material reasons for active participation."[23] The 
moral defense of collaboration was constructed through mimicry of Confucian paternalism: 
France became father, teacher and protector to the Vietnamese son who responded with filial 
piety, gratitude and diligence. 
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The Vietnamese collaborationist elite also adapted and stretched Confucian dogma to create a 
quasi-Confucian collaborationist morality that balanced the French pretense of virtue with the 
more pragmatic promise of self-interest.[24] Marr's utilitarian interpretation of the classic 
Confucian dichotomy of "righteousness/profit" whereby "freedom was dependent on becoming 
strong, wealthy and learned" speaks to the "element of calculation ... [and] qualified ... loyalty" 
that coloured traditional models of Confucian filial piety.[25] Regardless, the French father was 
not troubled by the opportunism of his children-mandarin collaboration was too important for 
French rule to quibble over questions of sincerity. Thus, the French acquiesced to Pham Quynh's 
"prescriptions of moral-educational-cultural renaissance" promoting the return to orthodox 
Confucian moral principles or the "national essence" (quoc tuy) of Vietnam.[26] Furthermore, 
the French colonial government cast a blind eye to the 1932-33 campaign to model Emperor Bao 
Dai as a Confucian moral exemplar. French tolerance might have been assisted by the 
campaign's cautious qualification of ultimate French authority, but might also be understood in 
the context of the interests of collaboration.[27] 
The best, most persuasive example of the intersection of Confucian mores with the interests of 
the French imperial project is the Vichy regime (1940-1944). Under Marshal Petain, and his 
colonial administrator, Admiral Decoux, the National Revolution was transformed and 
reinscribed into the colonial context as a facsimile of, and companion to, traditional morality. 
The official motto of the Vichy regime, "Travail, Famille, Patrie" was promoted as a blending of 
Western and Eastern canons which demonstrated the "enlightened" and "rational" character of 
the new French administration.[28] The historian Eric T. Jennings writes of a "Machiavellian 
conflating of Vietnamese traditionalism and Vichyite volkism [which] would become a 
cornerstone of National Revolutionary propaganda in Indochina."[29] Collaborationist 
propaganda and editorials spun out reams of rhetoric promoting the harmonious symbiosis 
between Confucian morality and Vichyite reaction:
The new French maxim strongly resembles a Confucian one ... is akin to the four 
essential duties taught by Confucius ... individual improvement, the family nucleus, 
the government, and the pacification of the universe. From now on, the maxim of 
the new France is our own.[30]
Petain, himself, became "Confucius reincarnated": the man who would be "to the West what 
Confucius was to the East."[31]
Vietnamese schoolchildren were encouraged to rediscover their cultural heritage through a "re-
education in 'authenticity'."[32] These educational policies were part of a "Vichy-style 
federalism" which encouraged the teaching of the "rich folklore" of the five countries of 
Indochina.[33] Jennings writes: "In the realm of youth indoctrination ... Vichy planners plotted 
the rebirth of Khmer, Viet, and Lao cultures, closely tied in their eyes with Indian and Chinese 
traditions respectively."[34] Admiral Decoux's Vichy youth camps included a "new mandarin 
training curriculum."[35] 
For all this utopian harmony between the Occidental and Oriental worlds, the underlying 
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motivations of the Vichy regime were the same as those of Republican France: differences of 
ideology were subsumed under the unifying prerogatives of Empire. Petainist policies promoting 
a return to traditionalism, and the conflating of Petainism as a kind of neo-Confucianism, 
remained within the ambit of collaboration. Vichyite "federalism" was promoted as a "third path 
between assimilation and association" and epitomized the culmination of French imperialism.
[36] It sought, as the Vichy newspaper l'Echo annamite proclaimed, to provide a "moral and 
intellectual element" which would cement "a true collaboration between colonizers and 
colonized."[37] Admiral's Decoux's "native policy" was designed, through egalitarian measures 
which would give indigenous elite greater access to, and equality within, the bureaucratic 
hierarchy, to revalorize the status of notables.[38] This edified mandarin class could then serve 
as a vehicle for a new Petainist social order. Jennings writes that under the Vichy regime 
"mandarins were transformed from the scapegoats of Third Republican colonialism into the ... 
embodiment and conveyors of Vichy traditionalism."[39]
The smokescreen of Confucian traditionalism obscured the autocratic nature of Decoux's 
administration which Marr likens to that of the "colonizing French admirals of the 1860s."[40] 
Underlying the Vichy concern for social order and stability was the disquieting realization that 
they themselves had become colonized in Europe.[41] The German occupation of France and the 
threat of the Japanese occupation of Indochina redoubled the colonial imperative of maintaining 
the social order.[42] The mandarin elite and the conservatism of Confucian morality became 
allies in the Vichy regime's struggle to maintain a tenuous sovereignty.
The French colonial regime's changing attitudes and policies towards Confucianism and the 
mandarin elite illustrate the fundamental tensions of imperialism, particularly of the altruistic, 
humanitarian and enlightened imperialism which France-in both its Republican and Vichyite 
incarnations-sought to embody. The vacillating educational policies vis-à-vis Confucian 
institutions and ideas speak to a self-defeating attempt to square the circle of assimilation and 
association, denigration and valorization, and a morality of inclusion and exclusion; thus 
underscoring the ultimate fallacy of mise-en-valeur in French colonial Indochina. 
Confucianism, Vietnamese Nationalism and Communism
If Confucianism revealed the uneasy ambiguities of French colonialism, it was no less subversive 
for indigenous Vietnamese society. An analysis of the utility and influence of Confucian thought 
and institutions for the Vietnamese revolutionary and Communist movements must begin with 
an understanding of Vietnamese history and traditional forms of resistance. Vietnamese culture 
and identity are defined by the creative tensions and hybridity resulting from a history of 
conquest and resistance.[43] Chinese imperialism and imperial aspirations, beginning from the 
third century B.C. and culminating in ten centuries of Chinese rule between the Han and T'ang 
dynasties, are central to an understanding of Vietnamese national identity.[44] As David G. 
Marr asserts:
Paradoxically, group identity may be understood best in terms of group 
differentiation. In other words, groups seldom ponder their commonality actively 
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until faced with internal cleavage or the menace ... of outside intervention ... the 
historian of Vietnam is repeatedly struck by the degree to which the Vietnamese 
have tended to define themselves in terms of their neighbors.[45]
The creation myth of the Vietnamese people describes national descent from the progeny of a 
union between a dragon and a fairy.[46] Nguyen Van Ky explains in his revisionist examination 
of Vietnamese folklore and oral history, that this mythical union is indicative of two antithetical 
traditions, which he frames as the binary opposition of a Chinese patrilineal and indigenous 
Vietnamese matrilineal social order.[47]
These hybridities and tensions vis-à-vis the Vietnamese relationship with China are reflected in 
the history of Vietnamese ideas, cultural and literary forms, and in strategies of resistance. 
Marr's interpretation of this creation myth speaks to a recurrent and persuasive theme running 
throughout Vietnamese history, which is reflected in literary traditions and archetypes: "This 
may have been the ideal Vietnamese image of their relationship to the Chinese: dependent on 
the same sources ... same roots, yet with an independent history that ... gave China no right of 
political hegemony."[48] 
Throughout the ten centuries of Chinese imperial rule, and the succeeding nine centuries of 
autonomy within the Chinese cultural world, Vietnam retained a remarkable degree of 
distinctiveness.[49] John T. McAlister and Paul Mus write of the strength of the Vietnamese 
"unyielding sense of ... identity": 
From the very beginning and from the very depths of themselves they must have escaped from 
the official formalism that had been characteristic of Chinese civilization.[50]
C.P. FitzGerald argues that the separate character and identity of the Vietnamese derived in part 
from Chinese strategies of imperial rule which depended, not on Chinese immigration from the 
North, but on rule by Chinese officials. Imposing rule upon a nation of rice-farming peasants, 
through establishing Chinese-style institutions in Vietnam, was relatively easy and did not 
require Chinese imperial settlement. Therefore, although Vietnamese culture assimilated many 
Chinese influences, "the ethnic character of the people continued to be ... 'Viet' and they 
inherited and cherished that consciousness of difference in race and desire for separate 
nationhood."[51] The Chinese rulers found that it was more economical to permit the indigenous 
leaders to become landlords in the Chinese landlord-tenant model of social organization.[52] 
These landlords were educated in and were encouraged to adopt Chinese customs and ideas, 
among which Confucianism factored largely, and this allowed them to gain positions in the 
imperial civil service.[53] Revolts against Chinese rule, in early Vietnamese history, were seldom 
led by the gentry but by the peasants.[54] Thus, it was this system of absentee and delegated 
imperial authority that lies at the root of one of the fundamental characteristics and paradoxes 
of Vietnamese society, namely the traditional power and equally traditional alienation of the 
Sinified landlord scholar-gentry vis-à-vis the peasantry.[55] Marr argues that the appropriation 
of Chinese learning, and particularly of Confucian models, could be used as a weapon against 
their own people. Through organizing orthodoxy campaigns to uphold the "five social 
http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/cheung-gertler.html (8 of 23)7/17/2008 9:55:54 AM
Jasmin H. Cheung-Gertler - The Moral Imperative and the Politics of Confuc...ina: Vietnamese Strategies of Resistance, Appropriation and Transformation
relationships," Vietnamese elites sought to represent rigid Confucian hierarchies as the "natural 
order of human existence."[56] Their denunciations were largely politically, rather than 
ethically, motivated.
Confucian models and ideas, however, were not exclusively draconian influences, nor were 
moral codes merely a fraudulent smokescreen for bureaucratic abuses. Marr argues that the 
traditional elite did conceive of itself primarily in intellectual and moral terms.[57] The basis of 
their legitimacy and power among the peasantry was an "implied moral covenant" whereby the 
mandarins upheld the "soul" (linh hon) and "spiritual locus of society" in times of crisis.[58] It is 
such moral rectitude that motivated the influential minority of scholar-gentry of the early 20th 
century, such as Phan Boi Chau, to resist collaboration with the French ruling classes.[59] 
Confucianism and the Sinified scholar-gentry have therefore been variously associated with 
reactionary conservatism and collaboration with foreign imperial powers as well as with a 
patriotic concern for social reform and national virtue. Marr writes of this class of educated elite:
Over the next few centuries [following the first century rebellion led by the Trung 
sisters] a hybrid elite seems to have developed, drawing heavily on Chinese culture 
and political precedent, yet also prone to defending its own interests rather than 
those of the faraway Chinese court.[60] 
The founding of the Le dynasty (1428-1788 AD) illustrates the paradoxical marriage between 
Confucian doctrines and Vietnamese nationalism. Le Loi's 1428 proclamation which 
reestablished in "vigorous, aggressive prose" Vietnam's separateness from China also 
incorporated "most Chinese classical and imperial symbols as implicit legitimization by Le Loi of 
his ... new dynasty."[61] Furthermore, Le Loi chose not to obliterate the collaborator mandarin 
families but rather allowed them to "buy their way back from annihilation."[62] Alexander 
Woodside's definition of the "two traditions"[63] of the Vietnamese Nguyen monarchy is 
illustrative of these social contradictions and ambiguities. He argues that the Nguyen court was 
influenced by two streams of thought: Chinese Confucian hierarchy, as represented by an early 
19th century educational primer entitled "Twenty-four Stories of Filial Piety" (Nhi Thap Tu 
Hieu); and a "mythopoeic and religious" ideology, represented by the "Anthology of the Spirits of 
the Departed of the Vietnamese Domain" (Viet Dien U Linh Tap).[64] The latter encompassed a 
belief in a congruity between spiritual and material worlds manifested by the transgression of 
these boundaries by dead heroes, the virtues of whom were expressed by contemporary 
Vietnamese rulers.[65] This pantheon of heroic "un-dead" included the Trung sisters, an eighth-
century rebel leader who fought against T'ang Chinese rule, agrarian deities and "an early, 
autonomous Chinese governor of Vietnam ... who had brought higher Chinese culture to the 
Vietnamese people."[66] The ideal Vietnamese ruler, as conceived by this dual monarchical 
tradition, had to encompass characteristics of rebel, guardian of agrarian and social stability, 
and Confucian scholasticism.[67]
Vietnamese literary traditions and archetypes speak to the integration of Chinese culture and the 
ways in which Chinese Confucian models and forms, including its human manifestation in the 
class of scholar-gentry, were appropriated, reinscribed and transformed within discourses of 
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Vietnamese nationalism. Marr argues that the scholar-elite "tended to detach Chinese thoughts 
and practices from their original contexts ... picking and choosing whatever met their fancy as 
Vietnamese," thereby creating specific interpretations of, and uses for, classical thought.[68] 
The satiric, political poetry of Cao Ba Quat ( ... - 1854) is particularly representative of what 
Woodside calls a "romantic tradition in Vietnamese political literature."[69] Quat was 
considered to be one of the literary stars of his time and his failure to pass the metropolitan 
examinations attributed to an "insolent wit and skeptical individualism."[70] His verses 
embodied the fruitful symbiosis of Chinese Confucian and literary forms with social criticism 
and Vietnamese cultural resistance:
The ideological premises of the Sino-Vietnamese bureaucracy were more likely to 
be assailed in Vietnam than they were in China. Yet they were often assailed, 
ironically, by Chinese literary references, which writers like Quat employed as 
political variables independent of ... their usual narrowly orthodox contents.[71]
Quat was particularly prophetic in his portrait of a true Vietnamese iconoclast, which illustrated 
the deep-seated and Confucian belief in the moral and social leadership of the scholar-gentry: 
There is a man: his appearance is wretched but he belongs to a noble family ... His mouth still 
smells of milk [from his mother] ... The freshness of his student's countenance is apparent; he 
opens his eyes, recognizes the world, and [just dares to] kick the doors of his masters. 
Shamelessly summoning up the courage of the vagabond, he stretches out the hand created for 
him to change the direction of destiny.[72]
It is this simultaneous propensity both for cultural resistance and assimilation that has most 
defined Vietnamese society and culture, and it is as a product of this creative tension that an 
understanding of Vietnamese Confucianism, not to mention Vietnamese Communism and 
nationalism, must be derived.
From this understanding of balanced tensions and hybridities emerges the paradoxical 
relationship of the Vietnamese nationalist and Communist movements with Confucian ideas, 
institutions and models. In many respects, these movements were antagonistic to the Confucian 
status quo. By the turn of the century, French administrative and educational reforms had 
seriously corroded the Confucian ideology and the social institutions of Vietnamese social life.
[73] This decline, coupled with growing dissatisfaction with repressive colonial rule and disgust 
at the behavior of the "collaborator mandarins"[74] was manifested in a new generation of 
scholar-patriots, who, although derived from the mandarin class, rejected the past in favour of 
reform along Western lines.[75] This generation, of which Phan Boi Chau was the most 
influential[76], was influenced by the legacy of the "obdurate, militant, idealistic scholar-gentry" 
who had led the Can Vuong Movement against the incursion of French imperial power in the 
1880s.[77] Phan Boi Chau's decision to choose a career in revolution over a bureaucratic career 
was representative of his rejection of Confucian standards of success and led him to found a 
revolutionary movement to create a constitutional monarchy modeled after the Japanese Meiji 
Restoration.[78] Woodside notes that a Vietnamese proverb reads: "If one man becomes an 
official, his whole lineage can depend upon him."[79] In 1938, the Vietnamese novelist Khai 
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Hung's critique of the traditional Vietnamese family was published entitled "The Family" (Gia 
Dinh).[80] The family, as an integral part of the Confucian social order, represented the proper 
relationship between state and subject; to attack the family then, was to undermine the very 
basis of political power and legitimacy, i.e. the collaborationist Hue court.[81] Peter Zinoman, in 
his analysis of the significance of the prison experience for the emergence of Vietnamese 
nationalism and communism, writes of the phenomenon embodied by the verse "fortune lost, 
family dispersed" (tang gia bai san).[82] Prisoners, who had been forced to leave their families 
and wives, experienced a very literal family betrayal when their wives abandoned their marriages 
to live with other men.[83] This, together with other social forces at work in the prisons 
contributed, in the inter-war years, to a broad-based social movement rejecting the traditional 
family.[84] Collective imprisonment, Zinoman argues, was a great catalyst for the activism and 
iconoclasm of the years leading up to the revolution.[85]
It is important, however, not to take this anti-Confucianism at face value, or to deny the part 
that Confucian ideology and traditions played in early Vietnamese resistance. Part of the potency 
and strength of feeling characteristic of the "first" generation of scholar-patriots at the turn of 
the century was derived from their intimate knowledge and absorption of Confucianism. For 
although, as Marr articulates, Confucian dogmatism and traditionalism was not "the regime 
most conducive to a 'soft entry' into the twentieth century," the political character of the doctrine 
intensified dissatisfaction with colonial dominance:
Confucianism being perhaps the most politically oriented of any historic world 
doctrine. Man's strengths and weaknesses as a political animal were abundantly 
evident to readers of the classics ... With servitude staring them in the face, they 
began searching actively outside their own traditions for alternative methods and 
ideas ... [86]
Furthermore, the prerogatives of moral leadership among the scholar-gentry motivated 
resistance and opposition. The decisions made by leaders of the Can Vuong Movement are 
representative in this regard, as these were not a repudiation of Confucian social values and 
conservatism but, rather, Confucian decisions:
But mandarins choosing to fight ... retained the monarchist ideal and ... the 
confidence that they were neither betraying their forefathers nor leaving a 
besmirched reputation for their descendants ... they had to make agonizing 
Confucian choices between staying behind to protect family tombs and elderly 
parents and sallying forth to defend king and country, a choice that in itself would 
advance the development of modern patriotic norms.[87] 
As the well-known story of Nguyen Trai-who begged to follow his mandarin father into servitude 
in China, but was instructed to stay at home to protect his country-attests, to save one's country 
is also virtuous.[88]
Thus, the emergence of organized Vietnamese resistance and political movements in the 1920s 
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must be understood within this wider tradition, in which Confucianism factored largely. The 
petty bourgeois intelligentsia, from which sprung the seeds of the revolution, was largely 
composed of people whose family histories reflected the tradition of mandarin resistors.[89] 
Anti-French nationalist organizations, such as the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD) in 
Tonkin, and the Tan Viet (New Revolutionary Party) in Annam, drew its support from this 
traditional elite.[90] However, by the mid-1920s, these nationalist groups had largely become 
ineffectual due to internal fractures and division. Historian William J. Duiker argues that 
although part of the problem lay in the legacy of bureaucratic interest groups and secret 
societies, more serious was the disintegration of Vietnamese national identity which 
accompanied the collapse of Confucian institutions. The erosion of Confucianism cut the 
emotional bonds that had traditionally tied intellectuals with the rural masses, thereby 
undermining the ability of first generation urban nationalists to create broad-based anti-colonial 
alliances premised on a unifying common ideology.91 
Perhaps no other learned the lessons from the failures of the Vietnamese nationalist movement 
so well as Ho Chi Minh.92 Known in his earlier years as Nguyen Sinh Cung, Ho Chi Minh 
recognized the importance of ideology, and specifically moral ideology, for successful 
revolution.93 He understood that when the opportunity arose again for another attempt at 
emancipation, it would be ideology, a moral imperative allied to revolutionary utility, that would 
be decisive.
Ho Chi Minh was, like many before him, a product of the scholar-gentry class.94 His father had 
been an official in the imperial bureaucracy during the early years of French rule. However, his 
dislike for the "slavish" relationship of the Hue court caused him to leave this position and 
become an itinerant scholar.95 Ho Chi Minh's father's novel and reformatory attitudes towards 
the Confucian canon underscored an unorthodox education for his son which favoured the 
"inner ethical content of Confucian philosophy" over formal study of the classics.96 This was 
supplemented by patriotic stories recounting the exploits of Vietnamese historic heroes.97 
Duiker argues that these formative influences had a large impact upon Ho Chi Minh's world-
view and would come to factor largely in his particular breed of Marxist-Leninism.
The Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League (Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi) 
had as its primary objective, not the realization of a Communist society, but the creation of a 
mass nationalist party which derived its support from all progressive classes in Vietnam.98 The 
League, in its publications and pamphlets, attempted to appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and 
to the scholar-gentry elite as its motivating force.99 Communism, was arguably, a means to an 
end. It was the potential of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Ho Chi Minh found in reading 
Lenin's "Thesis on the National and Colonial Questions" to provide the unifying ideology 
necessary for a successful bid for nationhood, that motivated the rise of the Vietnamese 
Communist movement.[100]
Communism, however, did not and could not erase the legacy of Vietnamese social patterns and 
ideas that were, in many ways, a product of creative tensions and hybridities vis-à-vis China and 
its ideological export, Confucianism. Duiker draws parallels between the Chinese and 
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Vietnamese Revolutions:
The comparison with China is irresistible and persuasive: The early leaders of the CCP were 
most likely to be intellectuals descended from rural scholar-gentry families, while those of the 
rival Kuomintang tended to come from commercial families lacking a traditional Confucian 
background.[101] 
Similarly, over ninety percent of members of the League were from the urban petty bourgeoisie 
and a high percentage of the leadership were, like Ho Chi Minh, from families with strong 
Confucian traditions.[102] This trend can be understood in geographical terms as the majority 
of early Vietnamese Communists were from provinces in the Center or the North where the 
Confucian cultural heritage remained stronger than in the Westernized and commercialized 
South.[103]
How, then, to reconcile this strong and pervasive Confucian influence with the rise of 
Vietnamese Communism ... Ostensibly, Marxism and Confucianism are antithetical traditions:
Where Confucianism is built on a ... static conception of human society, Marxism is 
dynamic and ... progress-oriented; where Confucianism deprecate[s] material 
wealth as an obstacle to ... ethical standards, Marxism glorifies the productive 
process and views man as a natural creator; where Confucianism is fundamentally 
hierarchical ... Marxism is ... egalitarian ... [104] 
One rationale is that it is precisely the anti-Confucian character of Marxism that was the source 
of its appeal among the young off-spring of the mandarin class who had witnessed the failure of 
Confucian systems to prevent French imperialism as well as the collusion of the mandarin 
bureaucracy with the colonial regime.[105] Marr writes that those intellectuals who responded 
to "proletarianization" were "not only following Comintern encouragement but also trying to 
prove that their bourgeois and feudal upbringing could be thrust aside."[106] 
However these ostensible antagonisms belie a number of ways in which the ideologies are 
similar and mutually reinforcing. Confucianism shares with Communism a monotheistic vision 
of a single truth articulated through "quasi-sacred texts," the concept of "an anointed elite" 
charged with leading the masses through political and intellectual indoctrination, an emphasis 
on individual morality and service to society, the subordination of the individual to community, 
the belief that material gain should be subordinated to uplifting goals (rather than the 
motivating objective of human endeavour), and finally, a fundamental faith in the capacity of 
human nature for self-improvement.[107] Thus, a static interpretation of Confucianism is, 
perhaps, misleading. Destiny, or the "Way of Heaven" (Dao Troi), could be an active force as 
much as a stabilizing and conservative one.[108] The Confucian superior man, possessing the 
capacity to understand the Way, could and should influence the temporal and cosmological 
reality.[109] To quote Mencius, "there would always be times of revolt."[110] Duiker has also 
observed, "it is an easier step from Confucianism to Marxism than to capitalism, to a community-
oriented socialist society than to one constructed on a libertarian, individualist basis."[111]
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Perhaps, then the leap from Confucianism to Marxist-Communism was not so great as it might 
seem. It is possible to see other parallels between the two, in the processes of absorption, 
assimilation and transformation of Marxist ideology into the Vietnamese context. Just as 
Confucian forms and institutions were adapted to Vietnamese uses, as with the orthodoxy 
campaigns of the scholar-gentry landlords or the subversive poetry of Cao Ba Quat, Ho Chi Minh 
adapted and reinscribed Marxist thought within Vietnamese models, in which Confucianism 
remained an important part. Duiker even goes so far as to argue that Vietnamese Marxism was 
"a type of reformed Confucianism":
a Confucianism adapted to modern conditions, a dynamic new ideology dedicated 
broadly to ideals that had animated the philosophy of the old Master, but more 
scientific and ... revised to meet the challenges and possibilities of the modern era.
[112] 
In order to assess the persuasiveness of this argument it is useful to compare and contrast the 
ways in which Ho Chi Minh's brand of Communism differed from Soviet Marxist-Leninism. To 
begin with, Ho Chi Minh's ideal revolutionary was not the nihilistic anarchist of Nechaev, whose 
"catechism of a revolutionary" was admired by Lenin and became the bible of the Bolshevik 
Party:
For where Nechaev assumed that contemporary standards of morality had little 
relevance to the revolutionary code of conduct, Ho Chi Minh assumed that a 
revolutionary code need not do violence to traditional Confucian morality ... except 
for ... reference to the Party, Ho's commandments could easily be accepted in any 
devout Confucian home.[113] 
Vietnamese Communism also differed from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in its emphasis on the 
role of the peasantry in the revolutionary alliance.[114] While Ho Chi Minh did not formally 
depart from Leninist orthodoxy which advocated a "worker-peasant" alliance, Ho's version of 
the alliance did not discriminate between the "leading force" and "vanguard status" of the 
proletariat and the "basic force" and subordinate role of the peasant.[115] Given the 
overwhelmingly rural character of Vietnamese society, a revolution based primarily on the 
efforts of the proletariat was untenable.[116] The greater emphasis on the alliance between the 
leadership corps and the peasants correspond to Confucian models of social order and attitudes 
about the rural and peasant class: 
The Vietnamese village by its very rusticity had been an inviolable sanctuary of the 
nation. It was not that each village was capable of resisting individually. But these 
villages were found everywhere ... Vietnam is ... a way of being and living whose 
expression and means of expansion are the village.[117]
The exalted status which Ho Chi Minh attributed to the peasant population also implied a 
greater need for a unifying, populous ideology which would appeal to both urban and rural 
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constituents: "good leadership of the guerilla movement by the party of the proletariat is only 
possible if the latter possesses influence over the peasants, and if the peasants accept its slogans 
and struggle to realise them."[118] Ho Chi Minh's Communism was specifically adapted to 
appeal to the Confucian value-hierarchies and political models which remained influential 
among the Vietnamese peasantry. 
Finally, it is interesting to realize the degree to which Ho Chi Minh himself conformed to both 
the romantic Vietnamese archetype of the young scholar-patriot (which was itself a product of 
Confucian influence) and the formal Confucian ideal of the "superior man" (chun tzu, in 
Chinese; quan tu, in Vietnamese):
Ho Chi Minh projected all the desirable qualities in Confucian ethics: rectitude, 
probity, sincerity, modesty, courage, and self-sacrifice. To impressionable young 
Vietnamese intellectuals disgusted with the hypocrisy, corruption, cowardice, and 
greed ... in colonial society, Ho Chi Minh was the rare exception, the "superior 
man" in the broadest sense.[119]
Arguably, Ho Chi Minh exploited this image of the Confucian master in order to reinforce his 
appeal among the scholar-gentry and among the peasantry whose role in the revolution he gave 
much prominence. For instance, his textbook on Marxist revolutionary doctrine, "The Road to 
Revolution" included a section on the proper behavior of a revolutionary which corresponded to 
Confucian moral and social standards.[120] In this way, Confucian moral exhortation was 
utilized as a revolutionary tool. Like the first-generation of scholar-gentry anti-collaborators, Ho 
Chi Minh understood that "individual moral principle ... existed as a political force."[121] Duiker 
concludes that among the early leaders of Vietnamese Communism, the "moral imperative of 
serving the Vietnamese nation in its hour of crisis appears to have been the crucial factor."[122]
Conclusion
Confucianism in Vietnam cannot be divorced from the political sphere. Wielded by both the 
colonizers and the colonized, Confucian ideas, institutions, and the class of elite which was most 
closely associated with it, became integral to strategies of political legitimacy, power and control. 
French imperialism and Vietnamese nationalism and communism co-opted and adapted 
Confucianism to political uses: morality became Machiavellian. The particular potency of a 
primarily moral ideology speaks to both the character and traditions of the Vietnamese people-
for whom political legitimacy was located in the moral sphere of the Confucian social order-as 
well as to the persuasiveness of the moral imperative over purely imperialistic or nationalistic 
imperatives. The alliance of Confucianism with both of these became an irresistible political 
force.
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